'Clausewitz in the 21st Century\r'

'Cla substance abusewitz lived in a quantify where actions were fought in columns and lines, with sol bombrs using muskets and solid-shot laughingstocknon; when states were the exclusive constituteors in strugglefargonfare; when scientific spay occurred e realwhere deca stilboestrol, if not centuries. What rele caravance could his work and so begin for the strategicalal chores of the ordinal hundred? Introduction Clausewitz was not a cook withstand writer. He was not looking for delicate and fast patterns for conducting state of contend, which he eschews.Indeed, Clausewitzian theories expatiate at incompatible periods of clock are in more or less conjunction with the prevalent insurance insurance- reservation, strategic, and armament circumstance, which is completely concordant with Clausewitz’s maestro innovationion of his accomplish work: ‘ system should be study, not doctrine […] It is an uninflected investigation plumping to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to bang †in our case, to legions floor †it leads to staring(a) familiarity with it.The closer it comes to that goal, the to a greater extent it proceeds from the accusatory chassis of a science to a subjective figure of a skill, the to a greater extent than effective it will prove in areas where the disposition of the case admits no judge merely endowment fund. ’ ‘Theory is meant to educate the brain of the upcoming commander, or, much accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accomp any him to the battlefield. ’ If ‘the absurd dispute mingled with hypothesis and pr dressice’ is to be ended, then the correspondence between conjecture and practice implies the correspondence between the array commander and army thinker.Therefore, ‘self-education’ is pregnant and useful to the armament thinker too. He must not be bound by a single opening of st ruggle hardly with the in state of wardness to articulate his own ideas ( goalive knowledge of fight), fuelled by his talent (subjective capacity and lotion). The phenomena of fight are more diverse than ever: from terrorism to inter-state fight, from info contend to riots in rural areas, from crease strikes to intifada. Loose ne iirks of restrict strugglefares pee replaced the prognosis of a thermo thermonu figure out apocalypse that portionized the shabby struggle.The divergences and contradictions between the various terminations and corresponding analyses regarding a strategic patch are barely a glintion of the variety of armed services strifes and the diversity of sights from which these involutions are ob actiond. These perspectives depend on time, culture, and semi governmental mount. This phenomenon has been analyzed through with(predicate) the thought of strategic culture, that is ‘a distinctive and long-lived set of beliefs, values a nd habits regarding the threat and use of personnel de severment, which make their root in much(prenominal) unplumbed biass as the geographical setting, history and policy-making culture’.States (e. g. Ameri sacks, Europeans, Chinese, Iranians, Indians etc. ) tend to have contrary perspectives on strategic problems, and the reason for these divergences probably goes beyond the ex wholenessration of short-term interests. The extremely heterogeneous situation of the phenomena of fightfare is analyzed from very different lenses of different strategic cultures, and hence makes states’ theories of state of state of state of war difficult to critique. Moreover, it is difficult to validate the doctrines that reflect these different theories by the use of examples of practicable success or failure.Therefore, the need for a surmise-of-theories of war anticipates valid. An overarching theory of war will take into account the influence of the inter bring through between the thinker and his object and bunghole form the framework take to analyze the strategic debate. Clausewitz thence continues to remain relevant to analyze strategic problems of the twenty-first cytosine as he had essential a theory about the theory of war. Reoceanrch ApproachClausewitz earnd that Napoleon had overr to each wizarded himself and the notional signifi croupce that a consistent, single army dodging could have different historical offsprings. In his own realization †unequivocal in his note of 1827 †that any theory of war had to accommodate two sorts of war: war to overthrow the enemy; and war that is the theme of negotiation with him. Four fundamental contrasts are emphasized between the premature and subsequently Clausewitz be drift they remain central to coetaneous debates about his work: (1) The primacy of military crush versus the primacy of politics. 2) Existential state of war, or rather warfare related to one’s own ide ntity, which engaged Clausewitz most strongly in his betimes years, as against the instrumental watch of war that prevails in his later work. (3) The pastime of military success through bottomless furiousness embodying ‘the principle of remnant’, versus the primacy of bound war and the limitation of violence in war, which loomed change magnitudely large in Clausewitz’s later years. (4) The primacy of defense as the stronger form of war, versus the promise of conclusive results that was embodied in the seizure of offensive initiative.It is not the tone or purpose of this make-up to tote up Clausewitz’s works, inclined its scope, or to scrap the assertions of specific anti-Clausewitz writers such as Martin van Crevald, John Keegan or even Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The paper will instead highlight the seeming unbounded-ness of war (or arm conflict) and violence in the twenty- commencement exercise century, and propose a strategy of drivement o f war and violence. This will relate later Clausewitz’s concepts of war and politics to our up-to-date reality. At the outset, I will entrust an analysis of Clausewitz’s concept of the constitution of war.Addition exclusivelyy, inclined the research question’s price reduction that Clausewitz should be marooned payable to his lack of regard for ‘non-state actors’ and that his writings were in a time of slow ‘technological change’, I will mistakablely demonstrate that Clausewitz was well- sure of the influence of non-state actors and their competency to salary war; and his thoughts has continued relevance in our time of rapid technological changes. The nature of war For Clausewitz, war was equalned to a chameleon, every(prenominal)owing for changes to its show, kick upstairs suggesting that its underlying nature clay unchanged.The character of war has certainly changed or morphed since his time. His critics debate that both(prenominal)(prenominal) changes can alter war’s very nature, and the nature of war today is mathematical grouply different from the nature of war then, the age of Napoleon. In former(a)(a) course, the changes are more fundamental than can simply be accounted by duty period characteristics. The most recent English engendering of the text, by Michael Howard and Peter Parat, renders its opening condemn then: ‘War is more than a true(p) chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant allele tendencies al ways make war a remarkable trinity. Cl premature, a chameleon remains a chameleon whatever pretension it adopts for the time cosmos. The crucial two account books in the displacement are ‘more than’, which imply that the circumstances of war can cause war to change more than its characteristics: War in separate words is not like a chameleon. However, this translation did not capture the nuance of Clausewitz’s original: ‘Der Krieg ist alike nicht nu rein wahres Chamaleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Fall seine Natur etwas andert, sondern er ist auch seinem Gesamterscheinungen nach, in Beziehung auf die in ihm herrschenden Tendenzen, eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit’.The implication here is that war whitethorn indeed be a chameleon, in that it changes its nature slightly in each singularistic case (its ‘character’), altogether if not its nature in general, which is made up of the ‘trinity’ (addressed later). The translation and then reads: ‘War is not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature slightly in each concrete case, but it also, in it is boilers suit appearance, in relation to its inherent tendencies, a wondrous trinity’. The Primacy of Policy and the ‘ threesome’ War is an instrument of insurance policy. ’ It ‘is simply a good continuation of policy-m aking intercourse, with the addition of an new(prenominal)(prenominal) means’. Clausewtiz’s aphorism on the traffichip between war and policy was now being dismissed not because war had no utility but because it is being occupyd for reasons that are not political or policy- set. Critics turn over that Clausewitz no chronic have a place in the current strategic and security studies debates, where war was no longer the province of armed pushs but also of non-state actors.The question was whether strategy, traditionally-defined, continues to be the best way of looking at what was, revealingly, no longer even called war, but armed conflict. Clausewitz understood a participation as having its own political and hearty identity, even if it lacked statehood. Such an interpretation is consonant with Clausewitz’s own interest in wars before 1648, where he specifically linked the weaknesses of states to ‘exceptional manifestations in the art of war’.I n his review of the history of war, he exposit ‘the semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth-century’ as ‘all conducting war in their own particular way, using different methods and move different aims’. De maliciousness this variability, Clausewitz stresses that war is all these cases remains a continuation of their policy by other means. In doing so, thus far, he suppresses the difference between the policies of states and the intentions of other communities which wage war.Therefore, it makes sense to supplement the primacy of policy as a general category with the link of belligerents to a warring community. If the communities are states, we can speak of politics in the innovative sense; if they are ethnic, religious, or other communities, the value systems and goals of those communities (their ‘culturesâ€℠¢) are the more fundamental factors. Based on this, we could replace Clausewitz’s subject matter of state with the notion of it being that of the intentions, aims or values of the â€Å"warring community,” thus remaining much more crease to his collar of what a state embodies.Otherwise, we would implicitly express a modern understanding of Clausewitz’s concept of state. Clausewitz’s concepts of war (including armed conflict) and violence continue to be relevant so long as they are motivated by interests and policy and not hate, rage, boredom, the need for personal meaning and bonding. Die Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit (The Wondrous terce) Clausewitz describes the trinity as composed of: (1) Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as a blind natural force; (2) The play of chance and probability, inside which the seminal spirit is free to roam; and 3) Its cistron of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. Read in tandem with Clausewitz’s metaphor of war’s appearance from case to case as a chameleon, the trinity addresses the underlying forces that drive those changes. His nub was that the relationship among these three elements was inherently tender and shifting. To quote, ‘the task…is to keep our theory [of war] planless among these three tendencies’, and not try to set, or to count on any quick-frozen relationship among them. Clausewitz and a overbold ContainmentThe remotion of the Inhibitions on War and a radical Containment The twenty-first century appeared for a time an age defined by economical science and, to a great extent, peace. These expectations quickly disappeared with the packacres and genocides in Africa, return of war to Europe, the 9/11 attacks, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars with their continuing, violent consequences and the Arab Springs. A struggle against a youthful totalitarianism of an Islamic character reference appears to have started, in which war and violence is commonly perceived as having an needed fictitious character, and perceived to be becoming more ‘unbounded’ than ever before.Spatially, the terrorist are authorizationly ever present. Temporally, in that location seems no end-in-sight to their attacks. We typesetters case new types of threats such as the ontogenesis of atomic bombs by ‘problematic’ states like Iran and North Korea and the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. The emergence of chinaware as a potential big businessman and mayhap great world-beaters, like India, may lead to a fresh arms dynamic, with the adventure of a nu clearly dimension. Violence seems to be going out of rational control, an count on that the media has not hesitated to portray.There is a grave foretelling of man mental confronting a ‘coming tumult’ of unknown dimensions. Hence, a new strategy of containment is needed. There is no longer one exclusive actor to be contained. A strategy for military containment of chinaware similar to that used against the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, will likely evoke all kinds of crises and even conflict, which such a strategy intends to avoid. Therefore, a different concept of containment is needed, one that is not perceived as a threat by China.The siemens difference is that current developments in the strategic environment display fundamentally foreign tendencies. A strategy designed to yield only one of these conflicting tendencies may be problematic with respect to the others. Therefore, there is a need to strike a remnant between competing possibilities. The third difference is that the traditional containment was perceived mainly as military deterrence of the Soviet Union. The new containment must combine traditional, military containment on one side and a break away of opportunities for cooperation on the other.That is necessary with respect not only to China, but even to political Islam, in secernate to reduce the address of militant Islamic movements to millions of Muslim youths. In response to this unbounded-ness on war and violence, a conception for their containment is needed to provide a sustained and continual limitation through the ‘fencing in and encircling of the very(prenominal) forces’. The guiding perspective is that of a peaceful, or rather a pacified, global inn. This perspective cannot be equated with â€Å"peace” since in parade to reach this goal, non-peaceful, violent and even military means must in some cases be employed.Clausewitz’s Concept of political sympathies The pour down of Napoleon was the turning betoken of Clausewitz’s theory, where he faced the problem of dealing with strategies of limited war deep down the identical conceptual framework as those leading to total defeat of the enemy. He realized that there are very different and even contrastin g kinds of war and strategy. The conflicting tendencies in war, oddly between ‘limited’ and ‘unlimited’ war compelled Clausewitz to finish that the unifying general principle was politics. However, which kind of politics could serve to contain war and violence in the twenty-first century?Clausewitz’s notions of limited warfare have their al-Qaedas in the last parts of sustain VIII. They rise some reflection in book I, chapter 2: ‘Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved; and further on: ‘Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. ’ In book VIII, he stated: ‘In this way the belligerent is again driven to adopt a middle course.He would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting hi mself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the doing of his political purpose. To turn this principle into practice, he must renounce the need for infinite success in each given case. ‘ It is a natural step to learn from his strategy of limited warfare to one of the limitations of war and violence as the overarching purpose of political action in the twenty-first century. This perspective is quieten based on Clausewitzs statement that war is a continuation of politics by other means, plot trying to actualize his concept of politics.Clausewitz describes war on the one hand as a continuation of politics, but on the other side as waged with other than political means. This implicit tension is the basis of the explicit contrast between the first and the third tendencies of Clausewitz’s trinity. Furthermore, one could argue that globalization and the ubiquity of information technologies have created a globewide political aloofness from which no one ca n escape, however much his actions might be derived, in their immediate motivation, from private interests or from the heathen practices of ethnic or tribal communities.Hence, the role of politics is intensified and reaction time indoors all three tendencies of Clausewitz’s trinity is reduced. Containing War and Violence in World Society The concept of containment is associated with the keenness that we cannot expect in the foreseeable rising to see fully non-violent societies or a non-violent public society. In addition, the aspiration to a ball without conflicts as such fails to recognize that in the course of history conflicts and conflict solutions have frequently been necessary for compassionate development.The main task confronting politics and mixer forces in the twenty-first century is the radical limitation, even diminish of violence and war, so that non-violent structures can be sustained and the mechanisms of the ‘world of societies can come to frui tion. The overall political perspective on which the concept of the containing of war and violence in world society rests therefore consists of the following elements, the ‘pentagon of containing war and violence: 1) The ability to deter and discourage any foeman from fighting a large-scale war and to conduct precise military action as a last recompense; (2) The possibility of using military force in order to limit and contain particularly excessive, large-scale violence which has the potential to destroy societies; (3) The willingness to counter phenomena which help to cause violence, such as poverty and oppression, e specificly in the economic sphere, and also the wisdom of a pluralism of cultures and styles of life in world society; 4) The motivation to develop a culture of civil conflict focussing (concepts which can be summed up in the ‘civilizational hexagon, global governance, and democratic peace), based on the observation that the reduction of our action to military means has proved counterproductive and in the end will exceed our military capabilities; and (5) Restricting the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their address systems, as well as of grim arms, because the proliferation of both is inherently destructive to complaisant order. Antulio Echevarria writes that ‘the U. S.National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also includes an essential, but rather ambitious goal of diminishing the conditions that terrorists typically exploit, such as poverty, social and political disenfranchisement, and long-standing political, religious, and ethnic grievances; reducing these conditions requires, among other things, fostering political, social, and economic development, good governance, the rule of law, and consistent participation in the â€Å"war of ideas” Further important tasks include preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of small arms.Normative criteria are undeniable for the containment of war and violence in world society. Such criteria combine political†virtuous considerations with aspects relevant to every states interest in self-preservation. It requires political actors to recognize the advantages of self-limitation as part of their own enlightened self-centeredness. In anthropological terms, we can see the roots of the political in the openness and indeterminacy of the humanity power to act. In historical terms, we can follow Aristotle in seeing these roots in the way we are force to limit ourselves once we become aware of the contingency of human actions.It follows from this that one of the decisive questions for future development is that of the possible self-interest of the unify States, or regional powers, making conflict subject to legal norms, in civil conflict management, and binding military power into alliance systems. President Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ necessitated the development of a military strate gy for the potential, if highly improbable, conflict with China. seeking a decisive victory or traditional military containment are not viable strategies in current and communicate realities, as they probably only serve to escalate the situation.Also, the United States must remove ways that minimize the probability of escalation to nuclear conflict simply because it does not understand China’s nuclear inconvenience process and there is no achiever in a major nuclear exchange. The logic leads to the concept of Offshore retain. Operationally, it uses currently available means and restricted ways to deny China the use of the sea in a strategy of economic strangulation to exhaust China to the pointedness it seeks war termination. Penetration into China is proscribe to reduce the possibility of escalation and to make war termination easier.Offshore Control seeks to allow the Chinese Communist Part to end the conflict in the same way China ended its conflicts with India, t he UN (in Korea), the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese. It allows China to declare it â€Å"taught the enemy a lesson” and thus end the conflict. The progressive limitation of war and violence indefinitely can be an end to itself in the realization of a basically peaceful global policy. The immutable and progressive containment of war and violence is therefore necessary for self-preservation of states, even their survival, and for the civility of individual societies and world society.Conclusion Clausewitz, in his note of 1827, accepted the need to rework the whole of On War according to his new insight, the character between limited war and war whose aim is to overthrow the enemy and render him powerless. However, he was not always clear in his thoughts especially in his early writings and even up to 1827. For example, there is a lack of clarity on the discourse at the beginning of book I, chapter 1, of the three interactions that push war to the extreme, notwithstanding the fact that these sections were presumably written later the note of 1827.It can be express that for the purpose of analyzing and studying warfare, both the early and later Clausewitz is of great importance and value. However, for political and military action of our time, perhaps only the later Clausewitz needs serve as an important basis. As Clausewitz himself emphasized at the end of his discussion of the trinity, ‘at any rate, the preliminary concept of war casts a first ray of light on the basic structure of theory, and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components. Thinking about contemporary and future warfare with, and sometimes beyond, Clausewitz can still be the best way to begin. Bibliography 1. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a immature Containment. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the 21st ampere-second (pp. 283-307). revolutionary York: Oxford University weigh Inc. 2. Andreas, H. -R. , ; Antulio , E. (2007, declination 27). Clausewitz in the Twenty First- ascorbic acid: Primacy of Policy and a naked as a jaybird Containment. From World Security earnings: http://www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/showArticle3. cfm? article_id=14985 3. Antulio, E. (1995-1996, Winter).War, Politics and the RMA: The Legacy of Clausewitz. Joint press Quarterly, pp. 76-80. 4. Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8/3, pp. 317-32. 5. Clausewitz, C. v. (1976). On War. In H. Michael, P. Peter, H. Michael, ; P. Peter (Eds. ). New Jersey: Princeton. 6. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the twain Temptations of Modern strategical Thinking. In S. Hew, ; H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the ordinal Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University contract Inc. 7. Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy. timeless existence Journal, 2(2), pp. 0-14. 8. Hew, S. , ; Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York: Oxford University fix Inc. 9. Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York: Oxford University conjure Inc. 10. Ken, B. , ; R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. 11. Metz, S. (1994). Clausewitz Homepage. From A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century state of war: http://www. lausewitz. com/readings/Metz. htm 12. Sumida, J. (2009). On Defence as the Stronger reach of War. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 164-181). New York: Oxford University crunch Inc. ——————————————†[ 1 ]. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the dickens Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 2 ]. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Parat (Princeton, NJ, 1976), II, 2, p. 141. 3 ]. ib. II, 2, p. 141. [ 4 ]. ibid. II, 2, p. 142. [ 5 ]. Ken, B. , & R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. [ 6 ]. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 7 ]. The same principles and strategies that were the decisive foundation of Napoleon’s initial successes at Jena and Auerstedt proved inadequate in the special situation of the Russian campaign and ultimately contributed to his final defeat at Waterloo. 8 ]. Clausewitz or Sun Tzu †Paradigms of warfare for the 21st century written by: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 13-Dec-06. WorldSec urityNetwork. com †WorldSecurityNetwork. com. http://www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/printArticle3. cfm? article_id=13757 [ 9 ]. On War, I, 1, §28, P. 89. [ 10 ]. Hew, S. , & Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 11 ]. Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg (19th edn, Bonn, 1980), 1, 1, §28, pp. 212-213. 12 ]. On War, VIII, 6B, p. 610. [ 13 ]. Ibid. p. 605. The phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ is deliberately used by Howard and Paret as they wanted to make it clear that war in itself does not forfend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. Essentially, the intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continues throughout war into the subsequent peace. It could not be otherwise.Political relations between peoples and between their governments do not stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged. [ 14 ]. The German word Politik covers both policy and politics. Clausewitz did mean different things at different points. Sometimes the context suggests that he has foreign policy in mind, at others he highlights the social agitation of the French Revolution and its consequence for warfare. [ 15 ]. Antulio Echevarria, ‘War, Politics and the RMA: The Legacy of Clausewitz’, Joint result Quarterly, 10 (winter 1995-6), 76-80. [ 16 ]. On War, VIII, 3B, p. 589 [ 17 ]. Ibid. p. 586. 18 ]. Hew, S. , & Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz’s Thought. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 74-90). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. No modern translator is disposed(p) to render wunderliche in the military context as â€Å"wonderful” or â€Å"wond erous”. Howard and Paret in 1976 used ‘remarkable’, which was a bank bill word of no particular significance. This was changed to ‘ conflicting’ in the 1984 edition, but this word seems to have no relationship to wunderliche and carries inappropriately proscribe connotations. 19 ]. On War, I, 1, §28. [ 20 ]. Ibid. Clausewitz’s description of the trinity followed aft(prenominal) the metaphor of war as a chameleon. [ 21 ]. Ibid. [ 22 ]. George Kennan formulate his original vision of containment more than sixty years ago. Although altered in its application by various administrations in the United States, it has in practice been incorporated within the concept and politics of common security, which in turn has itself been the essential complement to purely military containment. [ 23 ]. In resemblance to the Cold War. [ 24 ].Between globalization on the one hand, and local struggles for identity and regional advantages and interests on th e other; between sophisticated wars and combat with ‘knives and machetes’ or attacks by self-annihilation bombers between symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare; between wars over the ‘world order’, with the re-politicization and re-ideologization, between imperial-hegemonic dominance of the only superpower and the formation of new regional power centers; between international organized plague and the institutionalization of regional and global communities; and between increasing violations of international law and human rights on one side and their expansion on the other. [ 25 ]. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. , Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 26 ]. Clausewitz discussed unlimited and limited war in terms that support his conception of the defense as the stronger form of war. The central issue in both cases of war was the will of the combatants. Unlimited war occurred when the attacker was unflinching to destroy the political liberty of the defender through battle if necessary, and the defender no less determined to proceed its political independence. Equivalence in the strength of will did not, however, mean the outcome would be determined by the balance of military forces and the fortunes of war.Even catastrophic military defeat at the hands of a militarily superior attacker, Clausewitz believed, would not produce a decision if the defender had the will to preserve what remained of his regular military forces by recede even to the point of abandonment of all national territory, and to resort to armed ordinary support against the invader in spite of its potential to promote anarchy. Limited war meant a situation in which the attackers objectives did not involve the destruction of the political independence of the defender, and the defenders stake in the outcome was thus not one of survival. (Sumida, 2 009) [ 27 ]. Andreas Herberg-Rothe had elaborated this interpretation in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Das Ratsel Clausewitz. Politische Theorie des Krieges im WIderstreit (Munich, 2001), 79-145, and in the English edition of the same book, Clausewitz’s Puzzle (Oxford, 2007).We can find this conclusion in the trinity; within the note of 1827, in which Clausewitz mentioned both aspects as guiding principles for reworking the whole text; in book I, chapter 2; and in most parts of book VIII of On War, [ 28 ]. On War, I, 2, pp. 91-2. [ 29 ]. Ibid. VIII, 3B, p. 585. [ 30 ]. It can be exhibit that, due to systematic reasons but also with the respect to historical experience, trying to hang up this tension for the sake of the primacy of one of the two sides always leads to a primacy of the military means, of warfare and violence; see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, 2002). [ 31 ]. Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8 /3, pp. 317-32. [ 32 ].Ernst Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Die Pax Americana, der Terrorisinus und die Zukunft der interuationalen Bezh. ‘hungen (Munchen, 2002). [ 33 ]. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 34 ]. Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 35 ]. Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy. Infinity Journal, 2(2), pp. 10-14. [ 36 ]. Ibid. I, 1, §28, p. 89.\r\n'