Respect, Coercion and Religious Belief :: Religion Argumentative Argument Papers

Respect, Coercion and Religious BeliefIn this paper, I articulate and evaluate an important transmission line in support of the claim that citizens of a progressive tense democracy should not support absolute policies on the basis of a rationale they know other citizens reasonably reject. I conclude that that argument is unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that religious believers who support coercive public policies on the basis of religious convictions do not disrespect citizens who reasonably regard such(prenominal) religious convictions as false. ISomewhere near the heart of much contemporary liberal political theory is the claim that if the state restricts an agents liberty, its restrictions should have round rationale that is defensible to each of those whose liberty is constrained. Liberals are committed to the requirement that all aspects of the social order should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual. But there are ma ny an(prenominal) kinds of claim which are particularly arguable, many about which we expect reasonable disagreement. Coercive policies should not be justified on the basis of such controversial grounds rather, they should enjoy public justification. That coercive policy should enjoy public justification implies that political actors are subject to various principles of restraint, that is, that they should restrain themselves from supporting policies solely on the basis of excessively controversial grounds. The point of advocating restraint is to achieve a minimal moral conception, a core morality, which is rationally acceptable to all and which provides the ground rules for political association. In what follows, I evaluate what I take to be the most compelling argument in support of restraint. For ease of exposition, I shall refer to this argument as the argument from respect. What is that argument? First an informal formulation. Suppose that John supports some policy which has i mportant consequences for the welfare of a certain type of animal, say, the spotted owl. Since spotted owls posterior suffer, and since they are conscious of their suffering, John should take into consideration the interests of the spotted owl when determining whether or not to support logging in octogenarian offset forests, John should include in his moral calculus the suffering generated by the devastation of the spotted owls natural habitat. Johns position regarding the propriety of logging in old growth forests doesnt just affect owls, of course it also affects loggers like Mary. Mary, like John, must come to grips with the issues raised by the destruction of old growth forests.